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1. BRENTANO’S THESIS
‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul
Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something
would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of
Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that
intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of
mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the
existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which derives
from scholastic discussions of concepts or intentiones.2 Rather, his originality
consists in his claim that the concept of intentionality marks out the subject
matter of psychology: the mental. His view was that intentionality ‘is
characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon
manifests anything like it’.3 This is Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the
mark of the mental.
Despite the centrality of the concept of intentionality in contemporary
philosophy of mind, and despite the customary homage paid to Brentano as
the one who revived the terminology and placed the concept at the centre of
philosophy, Brentano’s thesis is widely rejected by contemporary
philosophers of mind. What is more, its rejection is not something which is
thought to require substantial philosophical argument. Rather, the falsity of
the thesis is taken as a starting-point in many contemporary discussions of
intentionality, something so obvious that it only needs to be stated to be
recognised as true. Consider, for instance, these remarks from the opening
pages of Searle’s Intentionality:
Some, not all, mental states and events have Intentionality. Beliefs,
fears, hopes and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of
nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional....
My beliefs and desires must always be about something. But my
nervousness and undirected anxiety need not in that way be about
anything.4
Searle takes this as obvious, so obvious that it is not in need of further
argument or elucidation. And many others agree with him.5
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2Brentano’s thesis is normally rejected for one or both of the following
reasons. First, it is supposed to be obvious that there are both intentional and
non-intentional mental states: intentionality is not necessary for mentality.
Non-intentional mental states can either be of the kind Searle mentions
(emotions or moods, like undirected anxiety) or they are the so-called purely
‘qualitative’ mental phenomena—states which have ‘qualia’—of which
sensations (like pains) are the most commonly cited examples. Both kinds of
example are mentioned in an implicit rejection of Brentano’s thesis by Louise
Antony:
while mental items like beliefs and desires clearly have objects or
contents (an idea is an idea of something, and a desire is a desire for
something), things like pleasures, pains, moods and emotions don’t,
on the face of it, appear to be about anything at all.6
Antony remarks in passing that the opposing view—in effect, that pains,
moods and emotions are intentional—‘seems counter-intuitive’.
The second reason for the rejection of the thesis is that there are non-
mental phenomena which exhibit intentionality: intentionality is not sufficient
for mentality. Examples are more controversial here, but we find phenomena
such as the disposition of plants to move towards the source of light offered
as primitive non-mental forms of intentionality.7 Not every philosopher who
rejects Brentano’s thesis rejects it for both of these reasons, but it is
nonetheless fair to say that there is a tacit consensus that the thesis should be
rejected.
But this consensus raises a puzzling historical and exegetical question.
If it is so obvious that Brentano’s thesis is false, why did Brentano propose it?
If a moment’s reflection on one’s states of mind refutes the thesis that all
mental states are intentional, then why would anyone (including Brentano,
Husserl, Sartre and their followers) think otherwise? Did Brentano have a
radically different inner life from the inner lives of contemporary
philosophers? Or was the originator of phenomenology spectacularly
inattentive to phenomenological facts, rather as Freud is supposed to have
been a bad analyst? Or—surely more plausibly—did Brentano mean
something different by ‘intentionality’ than what many contemporary
philosophers mean?
The question of what Brentano and his followers meant by
‘intentionality’ is an important one, both for our understanding of the origin
of current debates, and, relatedly, for our conception of these debates
themselves.8 However, my concern in this paper is not with Brentano’s
theory of intentionality, but with a more general question: what would you
have to believe about intentionality to believe that it is the mark of the
mental? I argue here that if we think of intentionality in the light of this
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3question, a conception of the mental begins to emerge which abandons some
of the usual assumptions of contemporary philosophy of mind.
The rest of this paper falls into three parts. In the next two parts I
examine the standard counterexamples to Brentano’s thesis—certain kinds of
sensations and emotions. I argue that they are not genuine counterexamples,
and I sketch a conception of intentionality which arises from my the
discussion of these examples. In the final part, I claim that intentionality,
properly understood, should be thought of as exclusive to the mental
domain, and I conclude with some more speculative remarks about the
significance of the question; why do we need a mark of the mental at all?
2. THE INTENTIONALITY OF SENSATION
Since ‘intentionality’ is a technical term, it is standard practice when
introducing it to use some slightly less technical synonym or gloss. In
contemporary philosophy this is often done by saying that intentionality is
the about-ness or of-ness of mental states.9 Intentional states are those which
are about or of things, normally things other than themselves. So one might
demarcate the class of intentional states by considering a mental state and
asking ‘what is it about?’. If the question doesn’t make much sense, or if it has
the obvious answer ‘nothing’, then the state is classified as non-intentional.
Consider a pain you may have in your ankle; what is it of or about? Silly
question: it isn’t of or about anything. And so, since intentionality is of-ness or
about-ness, pain is not intentional. In this way, we find Colin McGinn arguing
that ‘bodily sensations do not have an intentional object in the way
perceptual experiences do’ on the grounds that ‘we distinguish between a
visual experience and what it is an experience of; but we do not make this
distinction in respect of pains.’10 This is one quick way to arrive at a denial of
Brentano’s thesis.
It certainly sounds awkward to talk of a distinction between a pain and
what a pain is ‘of’ or ‘about’. But all this means is that those who follow
Brentano in holding intentionality to be the mark of the mental—call them
‘intentionalists’—will not gloss the concept of intentionality solely in terms of
‘of-ness’ or ‘about-ness’. Intentionalists must introduce what is involved in
the phenomenon of intentionality in another way. How should they do this?
Brentano’s own view was that every mental phenomenon exhibits
what he called ‘intentional inexistence’. The term ‘inexistence’ has little or
nothing to do with the fact that intentional states (or ‘acts’) can be about
objects which do not exist.11 Rather, the term describes the way in which
every intentional act ‘includes something as an object within itself’.12
‘Inexistence’ expresses the idea that the object on which the mind is directed
exists in the mental act itself. For example: in hearing a sound, the sound
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4which one hears—a physical phenomenon—is contained within the act of
hearing the sound—a mental phenomenon. So, to generalise, we can say that
‘in the idea something is conceived, in the judgement something is affirmed
or denied, in love loved, in hate hated and so on’.13
Brentano rejected the claim that sensations of pain and pleasure are
not intentional. He argued that although intentional acts can take external
phenomena as their objects, sometimes their objects are internal. In the case
of sensation, for instance, the mind is directed on an internal object—a
sensation.14 Just as ‘in the idea something is conceived’, we can say that ‘in the
sensation something is sensed’. So one response an intentionalist can give to
McGinn’s argument is this. Intentionality is directedness on an object, and in
having a sensation, one’s mind is directed on an object: a sensation. A pain,
for instance, is the object of the mental state of being in pain. (This way of
thinking of sensation is what used to be called an ‘act-object’ account.)
The idea that sensations are objects is associated with the sense-datum
theory of perception, which is not a popular view in contemporary
philosophy. These days it is widely agreed that perception does not involve
the mind directing itself upon internal, mental objects—sense-data. But this
agreement does not derive from a general rejection of the directedness, or
intentionality, of perception. On the contrary, there is a widespread
consensus—as illustrated by McGinn’s remark just quoted—that perception is
intentional. It is just that the objects of perception are not inner mental objects
or sense-data, but the ordinary outer objects of the external world. So there
will be no dispute between intentionalists and many contemporary
philosophers over the question of whether perception exhibits intentionality.
If perception were the only mental state under discussion, intentionalism
would not be a controversial thesis.15
There are philosophers, of course, who think that although perception
exhibits intentionality—perceptions are directed on things outside the
mind—this does not exhaust their nature. This is the view, defended for
instance by Sydney Shoemaker, that in addition to their intentional
properties, perceptual states also have non-intentional properties, called
‘qualia’, which account for the particular conscious or ‘phenomenal’ character
of perceptual states.16 Qualia are not sensation-objects, but properties of
mental states. If there are qualia, then there are aspects or properties of
mental states which are not intentional, even if those states also have
intentional aspects.
Qualia raise many questions which I want to avoid for the purposes of
this paper. Certainly the strongest form of intentionalism will reject qualia
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5outright, as contemporary intentionalists like Michael Tye and Gilbert
Harman have done.17 But in this paper, I want to consider only a weaker
form of intentionalism, which says that all mental states are intentional,
regardless of whether these states also have non-intentional properties. This
weaker claim is certainly within the letter of Brentano’s thesis that
intentionality is the mark of the mental, although it is not so obviously within
its spirit. However, there is a good dialectical reason for discussing the
weaker thesis first: for if the weaker thesis is false—i.e. there are mental states
which are entirely non-intentional—then there is no chance whatsoever of
the stronger thesis being true. So from now on, I will mean by
‘intentionalism’ this weaker thesis.
Let’s return now to the first group of apparent counterexamples to
intentionalism: bodily sensations like pains, itches and so on. McGinn says
that we can distinguish between a visual experience and what it is of, but we
do not make this distinction in the case of pains. Pains, on this view, are not
about anything, they are not of anything, they represent nothing: they have no
intentionality. Rather, pains are purely subjective qualities: their existence
consists in the existence of a subjective state that tells us nothing about the
external world.
To hold this view is to distinguish pain from other cases of bodily
sensation where we are able to distinguish between the sensation and what it
is of: sensations of warmth, of cold, of pressure, of tiredness, of hunger can all
be described in terms of what they are sensations of, and what they are
sensations of are properties of the external world (temperature, pressure
etc.). So these are examples of bodily sensations which can be accommodated
by intentionalism: the intentionalist can say that these states of mind are
intentionally directed at those objective properties of the world in terms of
which we characteristically describe them. But what should an intentionalist
say about sensations where it does not seem as if this distinction can be made,
as seems to be the case with pain?
The answer mentioned above is that there is an object presented in a
state of pain, but it is an internal or mental object. Now even if we reject
mental objects in the case of the perception of the external world, can a case
be made for their existence in the case of bodily sensation?
Phenomenologically, the case for mental objects seems somewhat
stronger here than in the theory of visual perception. For it could be argued,
against McGinn, that a distinction can be made between a pain and the feeling
of the pain. Consider, for example, someone being woken up from a
dreamless sleep by a pain. For the pain to have woken the person up, and
therefore to have caused the person to wake up, it must have existed prior to
the awakening. But since the awakening is a matter of becoming conscious of
various things, including the pain, it might seem that the pain can exist
without the consciousness of it. Less controversially, perhaps, we can
distinguish between having a pain and noticing or paying attention to a pain;
we might therefore think that we can ‘pull apart’ the pain itself and our
attitude to or awareness of it. These phenomena seem to provide some
support for the view that pains are distinct from the consciousness or
awareness of pain, and that we can therefore think of pains as the entities on
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6which the mind is directed in states of pain. Further features of the way we
think and talk about sensations lend some plausibility to the view. Pains
normally seem to have location and extension in space and time, and we
effortlessly talk about them using singular terms and we predicate properties
of them as we do of objects and events.18
While many contemporary philosophers are happy to accept the
existence of irreducible mental properties, it is fair to say that most would
prefer to reject irreducible mental objects.19 Mental objects are generally
rejected for metaphysical reasons: their criteria of identity are obscure, and it
is hard to see how they can be accomodated by a ‘naturalistic’ world view.
However, my concern in this paper is with not with metaphysics, but with
phenomenology: the correct account of how things seem to us. It would be
consistent to hold that although phenomenology commits us to mental
objects, nonetheless we know on metaphysical grounds that there are no
such things. To say this would be to hold an ‘error-theory’ of the
phemonology of sensation, analogous to J.L. Mackie’s error theory of the
phenomenology of ethical value.20
Although I think that we must be alive to this possibility, it seems to
me that—independently of the metaphysical objections to mental
objects—phenomenology does not decisively establish their apparent
existence. For each of the examples discussed above admit of alternative,
equally plausible descriptions which do not require us to posit mental objects.
The phenomenon of being woken by pain, for instance, can be redescribed as
follows: I might be in pain when I wake up, but it does not follow from this
that the pain woke me up. It is equally consistent with the story that I was
awoken by some non-conscious event in my brain, which then gave rise to
pain when I become conscious. Likewise, the attempt to separate pain from
the consciousness of pain by appealing to the distinction between having a
pain and attending to it ignores the complexity of the phenomenology of
attention and awareness. There are different ways of being aware of an event
in consciousness: even when I am not paying attention to it, a pain can
nonetheless be in the background of my consciousness.21
But I do not need to dwell on the arguments for mental objects here,
since the defence of intentionalism does not need to appeal to them.
Intentionalism about bodily sensations can be defended instead by appealing
                                                
18Those who approach questions of ontology via questions of logical form might say that
just as we can argue for the existence of propositions, the objects of belief, by analysing the
logical form of valid inferences involving belief-sentences, so we can argue for the existence
of pains, the objects of pain-states, by looking at the valid inferences which are made with
statements concerning pain. For example: X has a pain in his foot; therefore there is
something X has in his foot. The plausibility of these arguments is, in my view, relatively
superficial, for the reasons given in note 21 below.
19A notable exception is Frank Jackson, Perception (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1977). However, Jackson no longer holds these views.
20See J.L. Mackie, Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), chapter 1.
21As Michael Martin says: ‘at best [these cases] demonstrate the gap between having a
feeling and making a judgement about it’. See M.G.F. Martin, ‘Bodily Sensations’
forthcoming in the Encylopedia of Philosophy  E.J. Craig (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1988).
Nor are the inferences involving statements about sensations uncontroversial; for although
we might be happy with the inference from ‘X has a pain in his foot’ to ‘There is something
which X has in his foot’, the inference from ‘X has a pain; Y has a pain; therefore there is
something which X and Y both have’ is clearly invalid if the ‘something’ is supposed to be
a particular object, and irrelevant to the present issue if it is supposed to be a property.
7to a perceptual account of bodily sensations, such as that of D.M. Armstrong,
or the kind more recently defended by Michael Martin.22 On this account,
bodily sensation is a form of perceptual awareness of one’s body. It is by
experiencing bodily sensations that we come to be aware of the state of our
body, and of events happening within it. The qualities of which we are aware
of in bodily sensation—the sensory qualities of hurting, feeling cold or warm
and so on—are predicated in these experiences of parts of the body. When
one feels a pain, one normally feels it to be in a part of one’s body; and even
when a pain is felt where there is no body-part in which to feel it—as in the
case of phantom limb pains—what subjects feel is that their body extends
further than it actually does. They do not feel as if their pain exists in mid-air,
a few inches from where they have lost their limb.
The strongest considerations in favour of this view derive from this
felt location of bodily sensation. An ache in my hand feels to be in my hand,
not in my mind. Rather than being something which is contained within my
mind, it presents itself as something on which my mind can concentrate,
attend to, and try to ignore. In fact, this much is common ground between
the believer in mental objects and the perceptual theory. But what tells in
favour of the perceptual theory is the fact that to concentrate on the ache, I
must necessarily concentrate on the part of my body which aches; the mental
object theory cannot explain this necessity. Attending to bodily sensations is
achieved by attending to a part of the body where these sensations feel to be.
This is because bodily sensation is a form of awareness, the awareness of
things going on in one’s body.23
Why call this intentionality? What this perceptual theory says is that in
bodily sensation, something is given to the mind, namely the body, or a body
part. Calling this phenomenon ‘intentionality’ classifies it together with the
case of outer perception, where the perceived portion of the world is ‘given’
to the mind; and with thought, where some object, property or state of
affairs is ‘given’ to the mind. What is in common between these different
states of mind is expressed in Brentano’s formulation: ‘in the idea something
is conceived, in the wish something is wished’. And in the sensation
something is sensed: the body.
3. THE INTENTIONALITY OF EMOTION
That is the basis of my case for an intentionalist view of bodily sensation. I
now want to move on to the second kind of counterexample to Brentano’s
thesis: Searle’s examples of ‘nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety’.
How should an intentionalist deal with these apparent examples of non-
intentional mental phenomena?
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8First we need to identify the phenomena in question. This is actually
harder to do than it might initially seem. Everyone will agree that there is
such a thing as being anxious and yet not being able to give an answer to the
question ‘what are you anxious about?’. But this by itself does not show that
anxiety can lack intentionality. For one thing, we have just seen that asking
‘what is X about?’ is not always the most uncontroversial way of deciding
whether X is intentional. And more importantly, it should not be a condition
of a state’s being intentional that the subject of that state must be able to
express what the state’s content is, or even which kind of state it is. Every
theory of intentionality must allow that subjects are not always the best
authorities on all the contents of their minds.
A possible intentionalist account of the state of mind in question would
be to say that the intentional object of the state of mind is its cause. So on this
view, when we describe ourselves as ‘just anxious without being anxious
about anything in particular’, we mean that we do not know the cause of our
anxiety. Now in some cases, it is certainly true that to identify the cause of an
emotion is to identify its intentional object.  But this cannot be true in general.
For one thing, the object of the emotion might lie in the future. Or the cause
of an emotion might be a past event which is too remote from the present
manifestation of the emotion to be properly regarded as its object. (It may be
true that the cause of someone’s fear of dogs was a childhood encounter with
a certain dog—but it would not always be right to say that that dog was the
object of their current state of fear in the presence of a different dog.) Or the
cause of the emotion might be something completely unrelated to its object.
(A drug may cause you to hate some person or thing.) So the fact that an
emotion has a cause does not by itself entail that it has an intentional object.
The intentionalist cannot refute Searle merely by pointing to the fact that
emotions have causes of which we are sometimes ignorant.
But, as we have just seen, nor can Searle infer that there are non-
intentional emotions merely from the fact that we sometimes say we are
anxious without being able to say what we are anxious about. Searle presents
the existence of non-intentional emotions as of it were something entirely
obvious. An intentionalist, however, will deny that it is obvious. There can be
no real debate about this matter if we are restricted to each participant stating
what they think is obvious. So how can the debate proceed?
In order to assess the what is at issue between Searle and the
intentionalist, we need to know more about how they would classify the
various emotions into kinds. What is it that makes anxiety, for instance, the
state it is? Whatever it is, it must be common to the cases where anxiety
clearly does have an intentional object and the cases which Searle is calling
‘undirected’. Remember that these are the cases where someone is anxious
but it is not clear to them what they are anxious about. The issue between
Searle and the intentionalist is whether the existence of these cases establishes
that there are mental states which have no intentionality. If we learn more
about what the intentionalist and non-intentionalist think emotions are, we
can assess their competing claims over whether any of them are ‘undirected’
in Searle’s sense.
Let’s start with non-intentionalism, Searle’s position. Perhaps non-
intentionalism could say that anxiety is distinguished from (say) an
undirected state of contentment by the functional roles of the two states. The
functional roles must be explicable in commonsense psychological
vocabulary, since we are after a phenomenological classification of the
emotions. And yet the functional roles must be relatively
9informative—‘behaving anxiously’ will not do, in this context, as a
characterisation of the functional role of anxiety. So perhaps we can say that
anxiety is characterised by the anxious person’s inability to concentrate, or by
an obsessive concern with trivial details of life, or by jumpy, nervous form of
behaviour. Contentment, by contrast, might be characterised by a benign
way of behaving towards the world, an enthusiasm for its daily tasks and so
on. However, this style of identifying the functional roles of anxiety and
contentment does so in terms of forms of behaviour which are manifestly
intentional. So while it might suffice for an account of intentional (‘directed’)
anxiety, it will not do for undirected anxiety.
For the non-intentionalist, there must be something directed and
undirected anxiety have in common, which licenses them both being called
‘anxiety’. And this ‘something’ must be detectable from the subject’s point of
view, if Searle’s claim is going to have any force—remember that Searle was
appealing to what is obvious to us. Yet this something must also be non-
intentional: it cannot be directed on anything. So the non-intentionalist must
say that an emotion like anxiety (directed or undirected) has properties which
are phenomenologically detectable to the subject, but are non-intentional,
involving nothing beyond themselves. These properties must therefore be
qualia: non-intentional, subjective properties. Just as there are (according to
many philosophers) pain-qualia and seeing-red-qualia, there are also
emotion-qualia which give the emotions the characteristic phenomenal ‘feel’
which they have.
Let us suppose, then, that anxiety is partly characterised by its
distinctive qualia. Now it is a plausible general thesis about qualia that there is
no intrinsic connection between any particular quale and being in any
particular objectively-identifiable mental state. For instance, there is nothing
intrinsic to the qualia involved in seeing red that links these qualia with the
state which plays the functional role of seeing red in normal observers. The
coherence of inverted qualia thought-experiments depends on there being no
such links, and most defenders of qualia, like Shoemaker, believe that qualia
inversion is possible.24 In fact, it seems part of the very idea of qualia that
there be this possibility: for qualia ‘point to’ nothing beyond themselves,
which would make them associated with one kind of objectively-identifiable
state rather than another.
So on the non-intentionalist view of emotion, it must be true that there
is nothing about the qualia associated with anxiety themselves which make
them anxiety-qualia: that is, associated with a state with the particular
functional role of anxiety. Just as seeing-red-qualia could, in some other
possible world, be associated with the state which in the actual world is seeing
green, so anxiety-qualia could be associated with some other emotion-state,
say contentment. This is because there is nothing in the qualia themselves
which connects them with particular kinds of emotion, objectively identified
(for instance, in terms of functional role).
So now it appears that a non-intentionalist has to accept the possibility
that there is a world in which contentment feels to someone as anxiety feels
to me. And while the inverted qualia story seems plausible when applied to
simple colour-qualia—after all, why shouldn’t green things look to you the
way red things do to me?—the story is very hard to believe when applied to
the putative emotion-qualia. For here we are supposing that the same
                                                
24See Shoemaker op. cit. note 16, 108-113, where he discusses the inverted qualia
speculation.
10
emotion might feel in opposite ways to two subjects in different possible
worlds—emotions have their distinctive ‘feel’ only contingently. But does this
possibility really make sense?
One might respond to this: so much for the plausibility of the view that
there are emotion-qualia. And I agree: even if there are qualia, to assimilate
anxiety to the experience of seeing red is a distortion of ordinary experience.
But how else is the non-intentionalist going to describe the characteristic
phenomenology of anxiety, undirected and directed? The nature of these
states cannot be described in terms of how things seem to the subject,
however vaguely stated. For descriptions of how things seem are patently
intentional, and so they will not capture the phenomenology of undirected
anxiety. Non-intentionalism is committed to emotion-qualia because it is
committed to emotions having properties which are non-intentional yet
phenomenologically salient—and non-intentional, phenomenologically
salient properties of mental states just are qualia, by definition.
But what is the alternative to this non-intentionalist view? How should
an intentionalist give an answer to the question about how to distinguish the
different emotions? One answer has already been suggested. Someone
experiencing anxiety might not be able to put into words what it is they are
anxious about; but they may still be able say how things seem to them in
their state of anxiety. And even if they can’t express it, there is still
nonetheless such a thing as how things seem to them. To begin with, the
intentionalist will start by distinguishing being anxious for oneself, and being
anxious for another. This is clearly an intentional distinction: in the one case,
one’s mind is directed on oneself, in the other case, it is directed on another.
The cases Searle mentions are are not cases where one is anxious for another:
otherwise it would be directed anxiety. So the intentionalist will say that these
are cases where one is anxious for oneself—so in these cases, one’s anxiety is
directed upon oneself. Being anxious in this way is a matter of having a
certain attitude to oneself and one’s position in the world: it is to regard the
world, for example, as a potentially disturbing place for oneself. This is one
way in which anxiety exhibits directedness. And it is an alternative to seeing
Searle’s cases as examples of mental states which are directed on nothing, as
Searle does.
It might be helpful to contrast, in these very general terms, anxiety
with depression. In depression, the world seems to the subject to be a
pointless, colourless place: nothing seems worth doing. The change involved
in coming out of a depression is partly a change in the subject’s apprehension
of the world. Things seem to have a significance, a purpose which they
previously lacked. And this can be true of a subject even when they cannot
say what they are depressed about. In this way, the phenomenon Searle
would call ‘undirected depression’ can be seen as having a certain
directedness or intentionality.
These brief remarks suggest that the difference between anxiety and
depression resides in the different manners in which the world, and the
subject’s place in the world, are apprehended in the emotion. This was
Sartre’s view:
My melancholy is a method of supressing the obligation to look for ..
new ways [to realise the potentialities of the world] by transforming
the present structure of the world, replacing it with a totally
undifferentiated structure... In other words, lacking both the ability
and the will to carry out the projects I formerly entertained, I behave
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in such a manner that the universe requires nothing more from me.
This one can only do by acting upon oneself, by ‘lowering the flame of
life to a pin-point’—and the noetic correlate of this attitude is what we
call Bleakness: the universe is bleak; that is, of undifferentiated
structure.25
Sartre’s view of emotions, in general, is that they are characterised by their
intentionality. ‘Emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world’26 he
writes, and ‘all the emotions have this in common, that they evoke the
appearance of a world, cruel, terrible, bleak, joyful etc.’.27 Sartre’s view
provides one general framework in which to defend the intentionality of all
emotions—even those which Searle describes as ‘undirected’.
Let me summarise this line of thought. Searle says that there are
emotions which have no intentionality. But this does not follow from the fact
that people cannot say what it is that their emotions are about. Nor does its
denial follow from the fact that the objects of emotions are sometimes their
causes, of which we are sometimes ignorant. To decide the issue about
whether there are non-intentional emotions, we should first ask what
disinguishes, from the phenomenological point of view, the different
emotions. The non-intentionalist answer to this question is committed to the
existence of emotion-qualia, and the implausible possibility of inverted
emotion-qualia. But the intentionalist who accepts (for example) Sartre’s view
of emotion as a mode of apprehending the world is not committed to this
possibility. The differences between the different emotions would not be
explained in terms of qualia but in terms of the different ways the emotions
present the world and the subject’s place in it. This is one way an
intentionalist can characterise the emotions Searle is talking about, like
anxiety and depression, where the subject is not able to say what they are
anxious or depressed about.
The phenomenology of emotion is a very complex area, and I have
only touched the surface of the issues. What I have tried to do is to suggest a
way in which an intentionalist can argue that these apparent counterexamples
to Brentano’s thesis are not really counterexamples.28 But what does this
treatment of the counterexamples show about the nature of intentionality in
general?
My original question was: what would you have to believe about
intentionality in order to believe that it is the mark of the mental? The way I
have approached this question is to try and specify the sense in which
something is ‘given’ to the mind in sensation and emotion, just as something
is given to the mind in thought and experience. The heart of the view is
inspired by Brentano’s phrase that in the idea, something is conceived; I say
that in the sensation, something is felt, in the emotion, something is
apprehended—and so on.
The issue is in danger of collapsing into an uninteresting question of
terminology if the notion I am identifying as intentionality had nothing in
                                                
25Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (London: Methuen 1971; originally published 1939)
68-69. For an illuminating introduction, see Gregory McCulloch, Using Sartre (London:
Routledge, 1994) chapter 2.
26Sartre, op. cit. note 25, 57.
27ibid., 81.
28Of course, this is not the only way for an intentionalist to account for emotion. Compare
Tye’s views: Tye, op. cit., note 11,  chapter 4.
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common with what others call intentionality. But this is not the case. It is
possible to isolate two main elements of the concept of intentionality as
discussed by recent philosophers.29 The first is the apparently relational
structure of intentionality, the structure Sartre and other phenomenologists
express by saying that consciousness is always the consciousness of
something.30 While intentional states appear to be relations between thinkers
and the objects of their thoughts, this cannot be true in general, since
intentional states can be directed on things which do not exist, and relations
entail the existence of their relata.31 (This point holds independently of the
truth or falsity of the doctrine of externalism, since even the most extreme
externalist must allow that intentional states can concern the non-existent.)
The second element is what some call the perspectival or fine-grained nature
of intentionality, what Searle calls ‘aspectual shape’.32 This is just the familiar
idea that when something is apprehended as the object of an intentional
state—whether a particular object, fact or property—it is always
apprehended in a certain way.
Both features of intentionality are present in my treatment of the
counterexamples to intentionalism. I claimed that instead of seeing bodily
sensations as instantiations of purely subjective, monadic properties, we
should see these experiences as presenting something—a part of the
body—as modified in a certain way. Bodily sensations, then, are primarily
states of awareness, and therefore apparently relational states. They are only
apparently relational since, according to the perceptual theory, phantom limb
                                                
29For a representative of recent discussions, see Tye, op. cit., note 11, 94-96.
30For instance: ‘all consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something’ Being
and Nothingness (London: Methuen, 1958; first published 1943) xxvii. Compare Searle: ‘It is
characteristic of Intentional states, as I use the notion, that there is a distinction between
the state and what the state is directed at or about or of.’ op. cit. note 4, 2; for a different
way of formulating the same kind of point, see E. Levinas, ‘Beyond Intentionality’
Philosophy in France Today A. Montefiore (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983) 106.
31This fact gives rise to one of the main problems of intentionality. For an excellent
presentation of this problem, see Michael Dummett, Origins of Analytical Philosophy
(London: Duckworth, 1993) 35-36. See also Caston, op. cit., note 2. Brentano came to
appreciate the importance of this point when he wrote the appendix to his Psychology
from an Empirical Standpoint (op. cit. note 3). There he says that ‘If someone thinks of
something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need
not exist at all’. He goes on to observe that ‘we might doubt whether we are dealing with
something relational here, and not, rather, with something somewhat similar to something
relational in a certain respect, which might therefore better be called “quasi-relational”’
(Brentano, op. cit., 272). Sometimes it is supposed (see Dennett op. cit. and Tye op. cit. note
11) that Brentano was concerned with the question of non-existence even before he wrote the
Appendix to his Psychology. It is true that in a famous passage, Brentano says that the
object of thought ‘should not be understood as a reality’ (88); but by this he is just reminding
his readers that he is talking about ‘phenomena’ or ‘appearances’, not about the
‘underlying reality’. In this sense, the physical phenomena with which he contrasts
mental phenomena ‘should not be considered a reality’ either. Compare, for example, the
following passage: ‘the phenomena of light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion
which [the natural scientist] studies are not things which really and truly exist. They are
signs of something real, which through its causal activity, produces presentations of them.
They are not however, an adequate representation of this reality... We have no experience
of that which truly exists, in and of itself, and that which we do experience is not true.’
Brentano, op. cit. note 3, 19.
32John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992) 155.
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phenomena (e.g.) are cases of awareness of a felt quality in merely apparent
body part. They are therefore analogous—in this respect only—to cases of
perceptual hallucination, where one perceives a quality to be instantiated in
an object which does not actually exist.33 If Sartre’s account of the
phenomenology of emotions is right, then there is a similar apparent
relationality in emotional experience: there is the experiencing subject, the
world experienced (or the thing in the world experienced) and the particular
way of apprehending the world.
The second element of intentionality—its fine-grained character—is
also contained within my account of sensations and emotions. A pain in one’s
ankle is a state of awareness of one’s ankle, presented as such, not as the
organic organisation of tendons, bone and muscle which one’s ankle actually
is. Similarly with the so-called ‘undirected’ emotions. In a particular
undirected emotion, the same world appears under one aspect—bleak,
terrible, threatening—rather than another. (Of course, there may be debate
about whether the world could properly be said to have the aspects or
properties attributed to it in an emotion—but this does not affect the present
point.)
So the core of the concept of intentionality, as discussed in much
contemporary philosophy of mind, is present in the theses advanced by
intentionalism. The dispute between the intentionalist and the non-
intentionalist is substantial and not just terminological. Where this
characterisation does depart from some recent discussions is in not starting
the discussion of intentionality with the notion of a propositional attitude. A
propositional attitude is an intentional state whose content—that which
characterises its directedness—is something evaluable as true or false. I do
not question the applicability of the notion of a propositional attitude itself,
but rather the tendency in some contemporary philosophers to see the
propositional attitudes as the sole home of the concept of intentionality.34
Obviously, the form of intentionalism I am defending here cannot accept such
a view, but even putting this to one side, the thesis that all intentional mental
states are propositional attitudes lacks phenomenological plausibility. To take
a nice example of Victor Caston’s: when asked to think of a number between
one and ten, what comes to mind is a number, not a proposition. And it is a
familiar fact that certain emotions, notably love and hate, can be directed on
objects rather than always on states of affairs. While the notion of a
propositional attitude must play an important role in any theory of
intentionality, it does not exhaust the application of the concept of
intentionality.
                                                
33Only in this respect, since it is not quite correct to say that a phantom limb pain is an
illusory pain—the pain certainly exists, one just perceives it as having a location which it
does not (indeed, in the circumstances, cannot) have. An analogy would be perhaps with
some device which made it seem to you as if sounds were coming from one direction when
they were in fact coming from the opposite direction (as when a ventriloquist ‘throws’ his
voice).
34For a clear-headed (but in my view mistaken) statement of this policy, see Dennett, op.
cit. note 11, 27-29. Even Searle (op. cit, note 4) who admits that much intentionality cannot
be expressed in terms of whole propositions (6-7), seems to commit himself implicitly to the
opposite in his analysis of intentional states by analogy with his account of speech acts
(26).The tendency is still pervasive: see, for instance, the definition of ‘intentionality’
given in William Lyons, Approaches to Intentionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995) 1-2.
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4. INTENTIONALITY, THE NON-MENTAL AND THE MARK OF THE
MENTAL
I have been defending the claim that all mental phenomena exhibit
intentionality. Now I want to return to the other part of Brentano’s thesis, the
claim that intentionality is exclusive to the mental domain. This will give me
the opportunity to air some speculations about why we should be interested
in the idea of a mark of the mental.
Now, the way I am suggesting we should think about intentionality, it
is a concept which applies to all mental phenomena, including conscious,
phenomenally salient mental states such as perception, sensation and
conscious emotional episodes, but also to unconscious beliefs, desires and
other mental dispositions. The binding idea is captured by the Brentanian
slogan that in the intentional state something is given. But can we find
intentionality in the non-mental?
It is sometimes said that Brentano’s thesis is a threat to physicalism
because it implies that intentionality can only be found in the mental and
never in the physical. Dennett, for instance, says that ‘the Intentionalist thesis
... proclaims an unbridgeable gulf between the mental and the physical’.35
But we must distinguish between the view that intentionality is not
present in the physical, and the view that intentionality is not present in the
non-mental. For if physicalism is true, then the physical is not the same as the
non-mental. Of course, Brentano himself—to whom the question of
physicalism would have been of little interest—says that ‘no physical
phenomenon manifests anything like’ intentionality. But if we want to remain
neutral on the question of physicalism, we should prefer a weaker version of
Brentano’s thesis which only says that intentionality is characteristic of the
mental alone. Whether the mental is reducible to the physical is a further
question; if it is, then some physical things manifest intentionality. But no
non-mental things do.
However, some philosophers take a view of intentionality which
makes it unproblematically a feature of many non-mental things. For
instance, some follow Chisholm and Quine and take the non-extensionality of
certain linguistic contexts as criterial for the intentionality of the phenomena
described in those contexts.36 Chisholm’s approach was to ‘formulate a
working criterion by means of which we can distinguish sentences that are
Intentional ... in a certain language from sentences that are not’.37 In essence
Chisholm’s criterion was that a sentence S is intentional iff: S contains a
singular term yet does not entail the usual existential generalistion; or S
                                                
35Dennett, op. cit. note 11, 21. The point derives from Quine: see Word and Object
(Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), 221. See also the opening pages of Hartry Field,
‘Mental Representation’ Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology vol. II, Ned Block (ed.)
(London: Methuen, 1980). Obviously, if one thinks of intentionality as a property of
sentences (as Quine and Dennett do) Dennett’s quoted remark makes more sense than it
would do otherwise. I quote it here because the idea that Brentano’s thesis presents a
problem for physicalism has survived the waning of the popularity of the linguistic
criterion of intentionality.
36See Chisholm, Perceiving (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), chapter 12, and
Quine, op. cit. note 35, esp. the § on ‘The Double Standard’. Note especially the following
passage: ‘the Scholastic word ‘intentional’ was revived by Brentano in connection with the
verbs of propositional attitude and related verbs ... e.g. ‘hunt’, ‘want’ etc. The division
between such idioms and the normally tractable ones is notable. We saw how it divides
referential from non-referential occurrences of terms.’
37Chisholm, op. cit. note 36, 170.
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contains an embedded sentence in a non-truth-functional context; or the
principle of the substitutivity of co-referring singular terms does not apply to
S. This disjunctive criterion is supposed to establish the intentionality (in
Brentano’s sense) of the phenomena described by the sentence S. Dennett, for
instance, says that ‘Chisholm’s three criteria come close to reproducing
Brentano’s distinction’.38
I will call this this the ‘linguistic criterion’ of intentionality. Some of
those who adopt the linguistic criterion take a deflationary approach to the
distinctively mental characteristics of intentionality. They point out that
intentionality, in their sense, is common to non-mental linguistic contexts,
too—for instance: modal, causal, dispositional, probabilistic or functional
contexts—and they draw various conclusions from this fact. They might draw
the relatively weak conclusion that intentionality is not the mark of the
mental; or they might draw the stronger conclusion that there is no special
problem of intentionality, if intentionality is shared by so many different and
(in some cases) unproblematic phenomena.39
The version of intentionalism defended here cannot accept this. This is
not to say that it would have to reject the view that causal, probabilistic and
the other contexts are non-extensional. Nor does intentionalism have to deny
that the features of intentionality I have just mentioned receive expression in
the linguistic structures which we use to describe it. So, for instance, the
apparent relationality is evident in ascriptions of intentionality (in the failure
of existential generalisation in non-extensional contexts) as is the fact that
intentionality is perspectival (in the failure of substitutivity of co-referring
terms).
What intentionalism must reject is rather the linguistic criterion of
intentionality itself. These linguistic phenomena are guides to the presence of
intentionality in ascriptions of intentionality, but they do not constitute its
essence. And given the way I have been proceeding in this paper, this should
not be suprising. Intentionality, like consciousness, is one of the concepts
which we use in an elucidation of what it is to have a mind. On this
conception of intentionality, to consider the question of whether
intentionality is present in some creature is of a piece with considering what it
is like for that creature—that is, with a consideration of that creature’s mental
life as a whole. To say this is not to reject by stipulation the idea that there are
primitive forms of intentionality which are only remotely connected with
conscious mental life—say, the intentionality of the information-processing
which goes on in our brains. It is rather to emphasise the priority of
intentionality as a phenomenological notion.40 So intentionalists will reject the
                                                
38Dennett, op. cit. note 11, 23. Compare Searle, op. cit., note 4, 22-25, who takes the correct
view of this matter, as I see it. See also William Kneale, ‘Intentionality and
Intensionality’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 42 (1968).
39A good example of this general approach is Enç, op. cit. note 7; see also C.B. Martin and
Karl Pfeifer, ‘Intentionality and the Non-Psychological’ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 46 (1986), and U.T. Place ‘Intentionality as the Mark of the
Dispositional’ Dialectica 50 (1996).
40For the idea of intentionality as a phenomenological notion, see Gregory McCulloch, ‘The
Very Idea of the Phenomenological’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society  93 (1992-93);
and ‘Intentionality and Interpretation’, this volume; J.E. Malpas, in Donald Davidson and
the Mirror of Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), §4.2, gives an
interesting reading of intentionality as a phenomenological notion, drawing on the
Heideggerian notion of a ‘horizon’. For a survey of various ways in which the idea of
intentionality can be applied beyond the central cases, see Martin Davies, ‘Consciousness
16
linguistic criterion of intentionality precisely because the criterion will count
phenomena as intentional which are clearly not mental.
This would be a perverse or circular way to proceed if we did not
already have a grasp on the concept of a mind. But we do have such a grasp:
it is that concept which we try and express when we say that to have a mind
is to have a point of view or perspective on the world, or when we say that
there is something it is like to be conscious, or when we talk about the world
being manifest to a subject of experience, or when we talk about the world
being a phenomenon for a subject. Some philosophers associate these ways
of talking solely with the conscious or phenomenal side of the mind, where the
conscious or the phenomenal is contrasted explicitly with the intentional.41
Consider, for instance, how McGinn formulates his pessimism about our
inability to explain consciousness:
We can, it is felt, explain what makes a mental state have the content it
has; at least there is no huge barrier of principle in the way of our
doing so. But, it is commonly conceded, we have no remotely plausible
account of what makes a mental state have the phenomenological
character it has.42
Here ‘phenomenological character’ is explicitly contrasted with ‘content’, as if
the two categories were exclusive. Sometimes composite states are
envisaged—as when perceptions are conceived of as having content and
qualia. But in general, the picture of the mind which lies behind remarks such
as McGinn’s is one on which we have two kinds of mental state: intentional
states which are not essentially conscious, and conscious states whose
consciousness is intrinsically unrelated to any intentionality they may have.
The trouble with this picture of the mind is that the classification of
both kinds of phenomena as mental seems to lack a rationale. The most we
can say is that mental is an accidental category, which presupposes no
underlying nature to the phenomena it picks out. As Kathleen Wilkes puts it,
‘it is improbable that something bunching together pains, and thoughts about
mathematics, is going to be a reliable pointer towards a legitimate natural
kind’.43 Wilkes here echoes Richard Rorty’s complaint of about the
heterogeneity of the concept of mind:
The attempt to hitch pains and beliefs together seems ad hoc—they
don’t seem to have anything in common except our refusal to call
them ‘physical’.44
There are two possible ways of reacting to these points. One is simply to
accept that there is no more than a nominal unity to the concept of mind. The
other is to object that there is something wrong with the whole
                                                                                                                                          
and the Varieties of Aboutness’ Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological
Explanation Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (eds.) (Oxford: Blackwell 1995).
41For the contrast between the phenomenal and the intentional, see, for example, Sydney
Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996) 112, 138.
42Colin McGinn, ‘Consciousness and Content’ The Problem of Consciousness and Other Essays
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) 24. See also his later remark that ‘subjective features lie quite
outside the proper domain of the theory of content’ (33).
43Quoted by Martin Davies, op. cit., note 40, 358.
44Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979) 22.
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picture—specifically, with the way of distinguishing between intentionality
and consciousness that we find expressed, for instance, in the above passage
from McGinn. If this is our reaction, then we need to find a way of
characterising mental phenomena which reflects the underlying unity of their
classification as mental: that is, we need a mark of the mental.
Some philosophers have argued recently that consciousness is the only
true mark of the mental.45 But this view battles with the widely accepted and
uncontroversial view that many mental states are unconscious, so its defence
is an uphill struggle. The alternative, which I have been canvassing here, is
that it is intentionality, the mind’s directedness on the world, which should be
thought of as the mark of the mental. If we take this view, then we must
reject the distinction implicit in McGinn’s, Rorty’s and Wilkes’s remarks, that
the phenomenal is one thing, the intentional another. Whatever the fate of
qualia, we must accept that all mental states are permeated with
intentionality, and characterising their phenomenal character—giving a
phenomenology—can be achieved by characterising their intentionality.46
Brentano’s view was that the science of psychology should be
distinguished from both physiology and philosophy, not by its methods, but
by its subject-matter. These days, it is less common for there to be serious
dispute among psychologists about the subject-matter of psychology. But
there is perhaps more disagreement in today’s philosophy of mind about
what its subject-matter is, and in some cases there is even disagreement
about whether it has one. Those who find this situation unacceptable may
wish to reconsider the popular rejection of Brentano’s thesis that
intentionality is the mark of the mental, and therefore the subject-matter of





                                                
45See John Searle, op. cit., note 32; for his view of the unconscious, see 155-156. A similar
view is taken by Galen Strawson in Mental Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995):
‘the only distinctively mental phenomena are the phenomena of conscious experience’ (xi).
46For some different approaches to the same idea, compare M.G.F. Martin, ‘Setting Things
Before the Mind’ this volume; and Gregory McCulloch, ‘Intentionality and Interpretation’,
this volume. My remarks in this last section are highly speculative, and raise many issues
which demand further elaboration. One question is whether the suggested ‘unification’ of
the phenomena of mind by the concept of intentionality can be achieved within the weak
intentionalist picture I defend here. For if one allows that the existence of non-intentional
phenomenal properties (qualia) is compatible with the intentionality of all mental states,
then it appears as if a question can be raised for weak intentionalism which is parallel to
the question I am raising for the McGinn/Rorty picture. More needs to be said about non-
intentional properties in order to assess the force of this question. Here I am indebted to
participants in the discussion at the Royal Institute of Philosophy meeting, and especially
to Paul Boghossian.
47I am very grateful to Michael Martin and Gregory McCulloch for many conversations
which have greatly influenced my views on this subject. I am also grateful to the
participants in the discussion at the Royal Institute of Philosophy meeting in February
1997, and to Victor Caston, Katalin Farkas, Marcus Giaquinto, Paul Horwich, Michael
Martin, Gregory McCulloch, Paul Noordhof and Scott Sturgeon for comments on earlier
versions of the paper.
